The Degree of Satisfaction with the Democratization of Georgia in the Opinion of Georgian Students: A Research Report

Abstract
The aim of the paper is to examine the assessment of the functioning of democracy and the degree of satisfaction with the democratization of the state in the opinion of the young generation of Georgians. The paper states that Georgian student youth recognize the political system of Georgia as a democracy with numerous problems that make them not fully satisfied with the process of democratization. To analyze this research problem, I have used a number of research methods based partly on primary sources. The main research techniques were: expert interviews; non-participant observations, and the CAWI survey. The questionnaire was prepared in Georgian was sent via the Internet to students from 28 universities, 10 teaching universities, and 2 colleges. The paper opens the door to further research on the young and democracy in Georgia; and it is part of a series of articles on the opinion of the young generation of Georgians about democracy and democratization.

Preliminary Remarks
In recent years, there has been a noticeable increase in interest in social and political processes in the South Caucasus, especially in political science research. These interests largely focus on explaining the specificity of the models of transformation of post-Soviet states, including answers to numerous questions about the opportunities and threats of their democratization. Georgia stands out among the countries in the region, considered a leader in democratic transformations. The literature on the subject indicates that primarily the systemic transformation after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the process of democratization of state institutions in terms of the system are being studied. There is, however, a research gap in work on the bottom-up approach, opinions on these changes, especially the opinions of the young generation, and the definition of democracy created by the post-Soviet societies themselves.

The research report is part of a series of articles on the views of the younger generation on democracy and democratization in Georgia, and it is also an empirical part of the series. The subject of research in this report is therefore the assessment of the functioning of democracy and the degree of satisfaction with the democratization of the state in the opinion of Georgian students. It is worth noting that this report is a summary of the results of empirical research, providing a contribution to further research.

The following research methods were used in the article: desk research, which was used in the preparation of part of the survey in the context of listing European standards and democratic values; comparison helped to collate the results of empirical research; the behavioral method was used to analyze the behavior of student youth towards democratization in Georgia; and the method of quantitative and qualitative analysis made it possible to examine the assessment and satisfaction with a functioning democracy by student youth and to collect expert opinions on this evaluation. The following research techniques were used in this article: expert interview; non-participant observations, and the CAWI survey (Computer-Assisted Web Interviewing), which is the main research tool. The questionnaire was prepared in Georgian was sent via the Internet to students from 28 universities, 10 teaching universities, and 2 colleges.

The questionnaire contained 10 questions and the respondents' particulars. Two questions related to the students' political activity and preferences, four related to their perception of democracy,

and the next four to the assessment of the functioning of Georgian democracy. The respondent's particulars contain questions about gender, age, and affiliation. The questionnaire was translated into Georgian. A total of 331 questionnaires were collected, of which 10 were not used in compiling the data.

The main hypothesis adopted in the series is: Georgian student youth considers democracy worthy to be defended, as they see it as an opportunity to modernize the state and the political system, live with dignity and fulfill their expectations and aspirations. Among the standards of democracy, they distinguish and particularly appreciate political pluralism, the rule of law, freedom of speech, the right to work and equal access to education, which is related to the opinion that higher education and university diploma, currently equated with Western education standards, are highly valued and can contribute to start a profitable job. At the same time, as shown by empirical research, young people are not fully satisfied with the course of the democratization process, which in turn affects their relatively low political activity. Yet, it is worth mention that the political activity is also affected by the status and role of the young of the social and political life. This phenomenon negatively affects the continuity of the generational dialogue and conflicts, especially between the "old" (attached to tradition) and "young" (open to the world) about the state, its modernization and political system, democracy, and its standards. Conflicts between and within generations significantly weaken the dynamics of the democratization of the state and the building of a civil society. There is a danger that the "paradoxical" young generation will become a lost generation in the context of the implementation of democratic standards in Georgia.

The hypothesis adopted in the article is: **Georgian student youth recognize the political system of Georgia as a democracy with numerous problems that make them not fully satisfied with the process of democratization.**

In order to verify the research hypothesis, I posed the following research questions:
1. How do students describe the current political system in Georgia?
2. Do students consider the prevailing system worthy of being defended?
3. Are the students satisfied with the functioning of democracy in Georgia?
4. How do they assess the individual European values and standards of democracy functioning within the Georgian system?

The work narrows the young generation of Georgians to academic youth as the future, emerging middle class and even the "new elite" of Georgian society, focusing on their views on democracy. Therefore, the methods used are limited by the lack of a complete picture of the adoption of democratic patterns by the entire young generation of Georgians, only by a separate group of students and within the scope defined by the survey questions. The second research and workshop limitation was difficult access to all universities due to the fact that the questionnaire was sent via the Internet—to the student youth who took part in the survey study at selected universities in Georgia. The third limitation is primarily the short period in which the research based on the CAWI survey was conducted— it is two years (2018-2020), so the analysis does not indicate a certain trend over the span of many years.

Georgia's path to freedom after the disintegration of the Soviet Union was closely related to the choice of the model of systemic transformation oriented towards democracy. Undoubtedly, this road has so far been paved with numerous problems related to the implementation of standards considered to be democratic. Moreover, the consolidation of democracy has not yet taken place and there is now a regression in the democratization process. However, it is worth paying attention to the milestones that actually position the country as the leader of democratization in the South Caucasus. According to Freedom House (2022), Georgia is partially free with a score of 58/100, and according to the Democracy Index 2021 (EIU, 2021), 5.12/10.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the first president of Georgia was Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who was quickly overthrown. His lack of a reform plan, both in the context of democratization and

economic issues, caused social discontent and, as a consequence, led to a civil war (Bodziany, 2014, p. 290). In 1995, Eduard Shevardnadze became president and brought corruption and internal instability to Georgia as well as on the international arena (European Parliament, 2021). Initially, however, he enjoyed public support, which decreased with time, until a coup took place. This coup was started by the political elite "created" by Shevardnadze. According to R. D. Kaplan, it was Saakashvili that was "the product" of Shevardnadze (Brodowski, 2019). The revolution affected the then young generation of Georgians, which is now referred to in the literature on the subject as *homo transformaticus*. Already in 2001, M. Saakashvili founded the opposition party—the National Movement of Georgia. In addition, a number of non-governmental organizations and movements emerged (including Khmara, founded by students from the TSU[1]), which stood in opposition to the Shevardnadze's regime (Pietrzko, 2018; Jagielski, 2013). According to the literature on the subject, one of the most important milestones toward democracy was the Rose Revolution, which took place in 2003. Apart from the overthrow of E. Shevardnadze, it was also the first step toward institutional changes that set the course for Georgia's further transformation and the country's foreign policy (European Parliament, 2021). The demonstrations started when the parliamentary elections took place on November 2, 2003, and more specifically after the fraud of the election results (which were observed by foreign observers). These demonstrations climaxed on November 23, when, after a plenary session, Shevardnadze tried to approve the rigged state, protesters captured the parliament, and the then-president was evacuated. Mikheil Saakashvili, the leader of these protests, became the new president of Georgia in 2004. It was 2004 that was a milestone in the democratization of the country. Numerous reforms began, including the police, army, state administration, fighting corruption and focusing on the implementation of European Union standards (Bodziany, 2014, pp. 290-293). However, it is worth emphasizing that Saakashvili did not introduce significant economic reforms or any concept of economic development (Pietrzko, 2018). When it comes to foreign policy, according to O. Pliszczyńska (2010), Georgia, due to its potential and geostrategic location, in practice must have a kind of protector. Georgia has been looking for this protector for two decades, above all in the West. At that time, a pro-Western course in Georgia's politics began.

A significant event on the path of democratization in a European form was the war with Russia which started on the night of August 7-8, 2008, when the Russian column crossed the Roki tunnel. On August 9, Georgian troops were forced to leave South Ossetia. At that moment, the Western world was unable to oppose Russia's military aggression, becoming only a mediating party in this conflict. This passivity resulted in financial aid from the EU (Furier, 2020, pp. 475-487). The following year in 2009, an agreement was signed in Prague between the European Union and six post-Soviet states— Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Ukraine. This agreement formed the Eastern Partnership initiative, established by Poland and Sweden. As part of this cooperation, one of the levels was precisely the one related to the implementation of democracy standards, those consistent with the Union's guidelines (Skiert-Andrzejuk, 2018).

The next turn took place in 2012, when the Georgian Dream (GD) party won the elections, and in 2013 the new president was GD's candidate Giorgi Margvelashvili, being the first peaceful transfer of power in history (Bodziany, 2014, p. 294). Initially, it was seen with social disagreement related to the change of power, especially after Saakashvili tried to control the media and ordered numerous arrests of opposition activists. The government of Georgian Dream maintained a pro-Western course in foreign policy. Talks with the European Union were held, and continuity was also maintained in relations with NATO and the USA (Pietrzko, 2018). However, in the context of the analysis of the current socio-political situation, this enthusiasm has already waned for some time.

Literature Review

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[1] More on the youth mobilization see the article by Giorgi Momtselidze, 2017, Political Mobilization and Youth, *7th Eurasian Multidisciplinary Forum.* Retrieved from https://www.gruni.edu.ge/uploads/files/News/2017/10/7th_EMF_2017.pdf#page=111 (30.12.2021).

Undoubtedly, there is a rich literature available on the issues of democratization, particularly on the issue of the systemic transformation and the "democratic" cooperation between Georgia and the EU––also in the Polish literature on the subject. It is worth emphasizing, however, that research on young Georgians in social and political life is rare and does not fully analyze the issue of opinions and satisfaction with democracy. It is worth pointing to a few items that describe young Georgians—one of the more detailed studies is the "Generation in Transition. Youth Study 2016—Georgia" report prepared by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, which covers not only the issues of young Georgians in political life (including their opinions on democracy), but also the entire spectrum of data on their life and professional goals, approach to family, education, etc. It is a kind of encyclopedia about young Georgians. However, this 2016 report should undoubtedly be refreshed. The article by Tamar Khoshtaria, Tinatin Zurabishvili, et al. (2021) also describes young people's identity formation and underlines the clash of traditions and globalization in their understanding of social and political life. In the context of raw statistical data, an important source of information is the Caucasus Research Resource Center, which collects surveys among the South Caucasus societies, where the young generation is also distinguished as a variable.

In the context of other research on young people in socio-political life it is worth mentioning the article by Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik (2006) on the youth's participation in electoral revolutions in Slovakia, Serbia, and Georgia, which is centered in the young generation's issues. The same issues are studied in the article by Olena Nikolayenko (2007) on the youth movements in Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine, as well as in the article by Taras Kuzi (2006) on youth and social mobilization in democratic revolutions (Rose Revolution in Georgia is a case study there).

In the literature on the subject are also references to building a civil society (Ghia Nodia's policy paper on civil society development, 2005; Orysia Lutsevych's briefing paper on civil society and democracy in Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia, 2013) and the role of kinship networks in this process (Huseyn Aliyev, 2014).

Methodology and Organization of Research
The questionnaire research was conducted via the Internet, carried out and analyzed in the period from September 2018 to December 2020. It was directed to students of private and public universities and colleges (Table 1).

Table 1. Universities to whose groups and forums the questionnaire was sent

	State Universities
1	Akaki Tsereteli State University
2	Tbilisi Ivane Javakhishvili State University
3	Tbilisi State Medical University
4	Batumi Shota Rustaveli State University
5	Georgian Technical University
6	Ilia State University
7	Tbilisi Vano Sarajishvili State Conservatoire

8	Sokhumi State University
9	University of Georgia in Tbilisi
10	Free University of Tbilisi
11	Caucasus University in Tbilisi
12	Tbilisi State Academy of Arts
13	Saint Andrews Georgian University in Tbilisi
14	Georgian Aviation University (Tbilisi)
15	Grigol Robakidze University (Tbilisi)
16	International Black Sea University (Tbilisi)
17	David Aghmashenebeli University of Georgia (Tbilisi)
18	Kutaisi University
19	Georgian Institute of Public Affairs (Tbilisi)
20	Caucasus International University (Tbilisi)
21	New Vision University (Tbilisi)
22	Business and Technology University (Tbilisi)
23	East European University (Tbilisi)
24	Sulkhan-Saba Orbeliani University
25	Telavi Iakob Gogebashvili State University
26	Shota Rustaveli University of Theater and Cinema
27	Agricultural University of Georgia (Tbilisi)
28	Georgian American University (Tbilisi)
	Teaching Universities
1	Gori State Teaching University

| 2	BAU International University, Batumi (Batumi)
3	Batumi Teaching University of Arts
4	Petre Shotadze Tbilisi Medical Academy
5	Teaching University "Geomedi"
6	Georgian National University SEU
7	European University
8	Guram Tavartkiladze Teaching University (Tbilisi)
9	Bank of Georgia Teaching University
10	Georgian State Teaching University of Physical Education and Sport
	Colleges
1	Free Academy of Tbilisi
2	Batumi High Marine Engineering School ANRI

Source: own compilation.

The research process began with the preparation of the questionnaire in English, then the questionnaire was translated into Georgian by a native speaker from Georgia. In trying to establish contact with potential respondents, Facebook was used to search for student groups appropriate for the university and through cooperation with the TSU, which was established as part of research field trips in 2017-2018.

After collecting the data, they were verified in terms of belonging to the group of respondents (10 questionnaires were filled out by foreign students studying in Georgia as part of a student exchange program, therefore 321 questionnaires out of 331 were analyzed), segregation and analysis. The percentages as well as the proper arithmetic means were calculated.

Characteristics of the Studied Group

The research material consisted of 321 students enrolled in private and public universities and colleges. Students were selected in terms of their permanent studies in Georgia, not as part of academic exchange. The respondents represent 23 universities (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Structure of the respondents by university (in persons)

Source: own research.

When analyzing the structure of the respondents, their gender was taken into account. It turned out that there were 108 men in the group of surveyed students, which accounted for 34% of the total group under study. There were almost twice as many women, i.e., 213 people (66%) (Figure 2). Moreover, age was also taken into account, the majority of which were people aged 18 to 21 (Figure 3), which is related to my concept of recognizing student youth as part of the younger generation.

Figure 2. Structure of respondents by gender (in persons)

Source: own research.

Figure 3. Structure of respondents by age (in persons)

Source: own research.

The academic youth in Georgia consists of 148,803 people (in the 2019/2020 academic year[2]), of which 75,365 are women (51% of students) and 13,372 are foreign students. When analyzing the table, it can be noticed that the most numerous group are people aged 20 (24,362, i.e. 16.4%), and aged 19 and 21 (15.8% and 15.9%). The least numerous are students aged less than 18 and over 35 (1.06%). The study was targeted at reaching the students via the Internet, i.e., Facebook. The selection of the research sample was random. Although it gives a limited possibility of inferring from a given sample to the entire population, in this case this selection method (taking into account technical and financial limitations) was the only feasible one and made it possible to collect relatively large material. Such a method of conducting research and selecting a sample may cause the obtained results to be somewhat prone to error. In research carried out via the Internet, it is not possible to verify whether the questionnaire was definitely completed by the student of a given university.

In order to examine how young people assess and are satisfied with the functioning of democracy in Georgia, the following issues were examined:
(1) their definition of the political system in Georgia—respondents were asked to indicate the best statement that describes Georgia;
(2) determining the value of Georgia's existing democracy—respondents were asked whether the current democratic system is worth defending;
(3) determining the degree of satisfaction with the general functioning of democracy in the state—the respondents were asked to what extent they were or are not satisfied with the functioning democracy;
(4) determining the degree of satisfaction with the functioning of particular values and standards of democracy in Georgia—the respondents were to assess 19 values and standards divided into 3 modules (1: civil, political and economic rights and freedoms in a democratic state, the rule of law; 2: Representative and Responsible Government—role of political parties, responsibility and effectiveness of the government, civilian control of the military and police, minimization of corruption; 3: Civil Society and Political Participation) on a scale of 1 to 4 (where 1 is low and 4 is high).

**Assessment of Democracy in Georgia**
The following section analyzes the results of the previously described survey, which will indicate the evaluation of democracy by the surveyed young Georgians—their determination of the political system in Georgia and the determination of the value of the democracy existing in Georgia. It should be emphasized that the Constitution of Georgia states in Article 1 that Georgia is a democratic republic, therefore, although democracy in the context of values, standards, and building democratic institutions has not yet been consolidated, it will be precisely the values that democracy is described on the basis of EU documents on the basis of which Georgia is currently democratizing.

When asked to indicate the best statement that describes Georgia, more than half of the respondents (59%) indicated that the political system in Georgia is a democracy, but with numerous significant problems in the functioning of this system. According to G. Nodia (expert interview, February 16, 2019), the problems seen by young people are primarily the tendency of the rulers to monopolize the government and, in the context of a democratic society, the lack of tolerance towards ethnic and religious minorities and the way of life. These youth, according to T. Turmanidze (expert interview, February 28, 2019), are people whose voices are heard in traditional media, social media and their political activity is also visible in the protests. Only 1% of respondents considered Georgia to be fully democratic, and 14% believe that it does not deserve the title of a democracy at all (Figure 4).

Figure 4. Answers to the question: "Which of the following statements best describes Georgia?"

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[2] The 2019/2020 academic year was analyzed because of the survey made from 2018 to 2020.

Which of the following statements best describe the Georgian country?

Source: own research.

When asked whether the current democratic system is worth defending, as many as 63% of respondents responded yes, and 11% - no. However, as many as 27% of respondents could not state (Figure 5).

Figure 5. Answers to the question: "Do you think that the existing democratic system in Georgia is worth fighting for or not?"


Source: own research.

Therefore, it can be concluded from the above charts that young people perceive democracy as an important system that is worth defending, but they do not consider the democracy functioning in Georgia to be fully democratic, because there are a number of problems that the state grapples with. On the one hand, as T. de Waal points out, these are problems related to the struggle of the ruling Georgian Dream with Western partners and deep social polarization [comment: mainly reflected by an equally deep division in the context of socio-political views of the old and young generations] (De Waal, September 9, 2021). Moreover, this is not only a polarization at the level of society, but also a polarization among the elites, whose pro-European parts indicate mainly geopolitical protection and a certain position in the Western world rather than the actual adoption of democratic values (Gegeshidze, de Waal, 2021).

Degree of Satisfaction with Democratization

The overall degree of satisfaction with democracy and the degree of satisfaction with specific values and standards were also examined. 52% of respondents when asked if they were satisfied or not satisfied with the democracy functioning in Georgia replied that they were rather dissatisfied, and 23% that they were rather satisfied and only 1% indicated complete satisfaction. Interestingly, as many as 11% of respondents had no opinion on this subject (Figure 6).

Figure 6. Answers to the question: "Are you satisfied or unsatisfied with the functioning of democracy in Georgia?"

Source: own research.

In addition, to measure the degree of satisfaction with functioning of the democracy in Georgia, the respondents were asked to evaluate individual values and standards of democracy—the respondents were to assess 19 values and standards divided into 3 modules (1: civil, political and economic rights and freedoms in a democratic state, the rule of law; 2: representative and responsible government—the role of political parties, responsibility and effectiveness of the government, civilian control of the military and police, minimization of corruption; 3: civil society and political participation) on a scale of 1 to 4 (where 1 is low and 4 is high).

As part of module 1: "civil, political and economic rights and freedoms in a democratic state, the rule of law", 10 values and standards of democracy have been identified, which correspond precisely to the rights to freedom and equality in various aspects. These values are listed on the basis of the values on which the European Union is founded—in this case the categories of freedom (based on the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union), equality, and dignity. The above categories have been transformed into individual values and standards. The respondents assessed each of the following values and according to Table 2 it can be seen that:

(1) arithmetic mean for all elements is 2.66;

(2) no value was rated 4 by the highest number of respondents;

(3) no value was rated 1 by the highest number of respondents;

(4) freedom of speech was assessed by 67.91% of the respondents as rather satisfactory or very satisfactory, most of which were rather satisfactory;

(5) freedom of religion was also assessed as rather satisfactory;

(6) freedom of association was also assessed as rather satisfactory or very satisfactory by 66.98% of the respondents;

(7) the right to social security was assessed as satisfactory by more than half of the respondents (50.47%);

Table 2. Test results. Module 1: "civil, political and economic rights and freedoms in a democratic state, the rule of law"

	1	2	3	4	No response	Arithmetic mean
Freedom of speech	7.48%	17.45%	42.99%	24.92%	7.17%	2.92
Freedom of religion and conscience	7.17%	22.74%	31.15%	30.22%	8.72%	2.92
Freedom of association (setting up parties, associations) and assemblies	4.98%	16.20%	36.14%	30.84%	11.84%	3.05
The right to social insurance	8.10%	29.60%	31.78%	18.69%	11.84%	2.69
Right to work	12.15%	31.78%	24.92%	16.51%	9.66%	2.61
The right to personal inviolability, housing, confidentiality of correspondence and ownership integrity	18.38%	30.53%	24.92%	16.51%	9.66%	2.44
Right to defend group interests	11.21%	35.20%	30.84%	7.79%	14.95%	2.41
Equal access to social assistance and education for all citizens	10.59%	27.10%	32.09%	19.63%	10.59%	2.68

Equality with the law of women and men	14.02%	32.09%	30.22%	12.77%	10.90%	2.47
Equality before minority law	23.05%	26.79%	22.43%	15.89%	11.84%	2.35

Source: own research.

Module 2: "representative and responsible government—the role of political parties, responsibility and effectiveness of the government, civilian control of the military and police, minimization of corruption" lists four values related to democracy and the rule of law. When analyzing the following data, it can be noticed that:
(1) the arithmetic mean for all assessed elements is 2.93;
(2) in the case of the right to vote and the right to stand, as much as 50.16% of the respondents indicated the highest score;
(3) regular and transparent elections were rated by 48.29%

Table 3. Test results. Module 2: "representative and responsible government—role of political parties, responsibility and effectiveness of the government, civilian control of the military and police, minimization of corruption"

	1	2	3	4	No response	Arithmetic mean
Regularly and fairly elected (parliamentary, presidential, local)	11.84%	25.23%	31.78%	16.51%	14.64%	2.62
Right to vote in elections and the right to be elected	4.05%	9.97%	24.30%	50.16%	11.53%	3.36
Possibility of legal opposition	6.54%	18.69%	33.64%	27.41%	13.71%	2.95
Civilian police and army control	10.28%	19.31%	31.46%	23.36%	15.58%	2.80

Source: own research.

In the case of Module 3 "civil society and political participation" it can be seen that the average mean is 2.6.

(1) the arithmetic mean for all the assessed elements is 2.61;
(2) the highest scores were the right to protest against the authorities (demonstrations, non-observance of unjust law) (63.55% of the respondents rated it 1 and 2) and the functioning of associations, social movements, politics, their independence from the authorities (54.52% of respondents rated it at 3 and 4);
(3) Independence of the press, radio and television from power and big corporations—43.93% rated it 1 and 2, and 44.55% rated it 3 and 4;
(4) Presentation by the press, radio and television of diverse views—41.74% of the respondents gave it 1 and 2; and 44.55% of respondents 3 and 4;
(5) Access to ordinary citizens for politicians and governors, the opportunity to present their proposals and governments to them—54.21% of students indicated values 1 and 2; and 33.95% 3 and 4.

Table 4. Test results. Module 3: "Civil Society and Political Participation"

	1	2	3	4	No response	Arithmetic mean
The right to protest against the authorities (demonstrations, non-observance of unjust law)	6.23%	17.13%	37.38%	26.17%	13.08%	2.96
The functioning of associations, social movements, politics, their independence from the authorities	6.85%	24.30%	36.76%	17.76%	14.33%	2.76
Independence of the press, radio and television from power and big corporations	15.58%	28.35%	27.10%	17.45%	11.53%	2.52
Presentation by the press, radio and television of diverse views	13.08%	28.66%	27.10%	17.45%	11.53%	2.58

Access to ordinary citizens for politicians and governors, the opportunity to present their proposals and governments to them	25.86%	28.35%	21.18%	11.84%	12.77%	2.22

Source: own research.

Discussion

Young Georgians are currently facing many challenges related to social and political and cultural life. These challenges are related to the lack of a consolidated democracy, which, in the times of a democratic crisis in the "Western" world, changes even more the shape and definitions implemented by societies. In addition, the transition to the third industrial revolution, global renegotiations of economic and military powers, acceleration of climate change, the coronavirus pandemic in 2020 and the war in Ukraine changed the trajectory of democracy and activities supporting the East, including Georgia. The search for a guarantee of security in democracy, on the one hand, and the lack of satisfaction with the democracy developed so far on the other hand have placed the young at a social and political crossroads, and Georgia itself at an international crossroads.

This research report is a summary of my study on young Georgians in social and political life. It is worth noting that this is part of a series that explores this issue in depth, and that this article is a compilation of raw data that may contribute to further research on youth. The results of research on satisfaction and evaluation of individual elements of democracy constitute the basis for research on the factors of this state of affairs. Undoubtedly, knowledge about the satisfaction with the functioning of democracy has a practical dimension for institutions researching the level of democratization in the South Caucasus and those institutions whose mission is to develop civil society in Georgia, and democratization requires building civil society as one of the basic standards of democracy. To function properly, modern democracy needs a civil society, i.e., a society of conscious individuals, active in the social and political sphere. The lack of this component does not fit in with the discourse of EU democracy, which has become the form in which Georgia is building its democracy. Nevertheless, in the case of Georgia, it has not yet been possible to build a fully participatory and inclusive civil society. Democratization requires the involvement of society in the process of transformation of the state on the socio-political level, in particular the activity of the young generation, which in the near future will constitute the future new elite.

Summary and Conclusions

Despite the visible social polarization in the context of choosing the path of socio-political change, the state started the process of democratization following the example of European standards and values and directing its foreign policy towards the European Union. These standards and values, interpreted on the basis of Georgia, are reflected in the consciousness of society and assessed by it, especially in the generation that was born in the democratic version of Georgia. The assessment and understanding of democracy by the young generation of Georgians is influenced by a number of factors, which are described in a separate article within this series of articles. Consequently, as the research results show, it can be noted that Georgian student youth consider the political system of Georgia to be a democracy with numerous problems, but worth defending it. In addition, research has shown that students are not fully satisfied with the course of the democratization process, especially with the right to work, the

right to defend interest groups, equality between men and women and ethnic and religious minorities, access to politicians and rulers, and the right to personal inviolability, housing, confidentiality of correspondence and integrity of property—therefore the hypothesis has been positively verified.

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